At their worst possible point are relations between the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Russian Orthodox Church, following the latter’s extremely fierce attack launched yesterday, Monday, 12/1, by the press office of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). The target of the attack – with serious, actionable, one might say accusations – was, of course, Patriarch Bartholomew.

According to the Russians, the Ecumenical Patriarch is a rogue instrument of British intelligence, collaborating with extreme nationalist elements and even neo-Nazis. Aiming to annihilate the Orthodox Church of Russia by seizing several churches from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia from the Moscow Patriarchate.

Bartholomew is accused by the Russians that “the Ecumenical Patriarch’s aggression is not limited to Ukraine and the Baltic states. His insidious behavior is gradually spreading to all the countries of Eastern Europe. They speak of “insidiousness” on the part of the Patriarch that is “gradually spreading to the countries of Eastern Europe. He plans to grant autocephaly to the unrecognized Orthodox Church of Montenegro to launch a campaign of repression against the ‘particularly stubborn’ Serbian Orthodox Church. He is acting like the false prophets as described in the Sermon on the Mount. That is, ‘they approach you dressed as sheep, but inside they are bloodthirsty wolves. By what he is doing, Bartholomew is dissolving the living Body of the Church-literally.”

The Bulgarian news agency BGNES reports that “Moscow is openly supporting Belgrade in an attempt to destabilize Montenegro, which is why it is attacking the Ecumenical Patriarch. The Bulgarians link the holy war between Moscow and Istanbul to the political turmoil currently taking place in Montenegro and the power recently gained by Milan Knezevic’s pro-Russian and pro-Serbian party.

Also, in 2016, Montenegro had a coup attempt in order to prevent the country’s pro-Western trajectory. The plot, which involved Russians and Serbs, aimed to overthrow the government and assassinate Prime Minister Milo Djukanovic. The move was actively supported by the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Bartholomew’s statement

Montenegro is the (relatively) new point of friction between the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Patriarchate of Moscow, while the big thorn remains Ukraine. However, as early as 2016, Bartholomew was reportedly trying to restrain Russians who intended to provide moral and religious cover for the impending invasion, calling it a “holy war.”

As the Ecumenical Patriarch had confessed in a public speech, “during the preparation of the Holy and Great Synod in Crete in 2016, I personally witnessed the efforts of the Russians, together with representatives of other churches, to include the reference to ‘holy war’. This was long before the Russians invaded Ukraine. We, the Greek Orthodox, fought a battle to ensure that this term was not mentioned anywhere.”

But Patriarch Kirill of Moscow is a staunch supporter of the invasion. He has gone so far as to bless Russian soldiers, assuring them that they are “heroes” and that “if you sacrifice yourselves by fulfilling your military duties, all your sins will disappear.”

In 2022, Patriarch Bartholomew harshly criticized Cyril, pointing out, among other things, that “as a religious leader, Cyril should have resisted the pressure from Putin and renounced war. But he did not do so, which saddens me. I don’t know how he will be justified in his conscience, but I am deeply disappointed in Patriarch Kirill. The war in Ukraine is neither blessed nor holy. It is a savage, homicidal conflict – and we pray that it will end as soon as possible.”

History of the sacred Istanbul-Moscow conflict

On the eve of Christmas 2013, the Holy Synod of the Church of Russia issued a communiqué, something like an ecclesiastical encyclical, specifically on the question of the Proteus as it is treated by the Orthodox Church. In short, the essence of the view put forward by Patriarch Kirill of Moscow was a direct challenge to the fundamental prerogative of the Ecumenical Patriarch. Cyril argued that in the Orthodox Church, there is no kind of primacy, but merely a line of primacy among the Orthodox Primates.

The next incident of intense confrontation between Archbishop Kirill of Moscow and Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew was prompted by the Holy and Great Synod of the Orthodox Church in June 2016 in Kolymbari, Chania, Crete. It appeared then that Kirill was charting a trajectory of head-on conflict with Bartholomew, as the Archbishop of Moscow ostentatiously turned his back on a historically significant gathering of Orthodox church leaders from around the globe. Because, while only a few months ago, in January 2016, Kirill had signed the convening of the Holy and Great Synod in Crete – and, in fact, he had also signed all the relevant texts, which had been prepared for 40 years in 5 different Pan-Orthodox Preconciliar Conferences (in the period 1976-2015), the head of the Russian Orthodox Church finally abstained from the work of the Synod.

The Ecumenical Patriarch felt, rightly, betrayed and deeply offended by Cyril’s behavior. Circles of the Patriarchate of Constantinople, expressing what Bartholomew himself refrained from stating, were extremely harsh. Describing the Russians’ conversion as “unethical behavior” and “the absence from the Synod constitutes proof of separatist tendencies on the part of Cyril and the Russians.”

However, the major controversy concerns the self-headship of the Ukrainian Church, an issue that is obviously political. Cyril, in full accord with Vladimir Putin’s will, immediately and unequivocally condemned Bartholomew’s initiative in this regard. Specifically, in April 2018, the Holy Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople decided to grant autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine.

The initial decision was followed by an additional one, which provided for the recognition of canonicity in the two former schismatic Churches of Ukraine, to which the majority of the Ukrainian people belong. However, in October 2018, the Holy Synod of the Moscow Patriarchate – which, in fact, met in Minsk, Belarus, and, surprisingly, not in its headquarters in Moscow. This Synod issued a document expressing complete opposition to Bartholomew’s choice to grant autocephaly to the Church of Ukraine.

The explanation of why the Ecumenical Patriarchate should not – and did not have the right, in substance – to recognize ecclesiastical autocephaly in Ukraine was lengthy and exhaustive. Cyril and his colleagues drafted the document challenging Bartholomew’s decision, citing “precedent” under which the Ecumenical Patriarchate appeared to be inconsistent with the past. The examples used by the Russians to expose Bartholomew referred to cases considered in Councils centuries ago. As for the more contemporary ones, Cyril reminded Bartholomew that in 1992 he had deposed and in 1997, even worse, had formally anathematized the former archbishop of Kiev, Filaret.

For its part, the Ecumenical Patriarchate countered with leaked statements that Kirill and the Moscow Patriarchate considered Ukraine to be Russian territory, hence they did not wish to create an autocephalous Church there, even though the situation of the Orthodox Ukrainians, due to the trisection of the local Church, had created a chaotic situation for the faithful. “We,” said those in Constantinople, “are attempting to overcome this distorted situation (which the Moscow Patriarchate completely ignored for decades). The granted autocephaly in Ukraine looks solely to unity.”

Intermittently, there was a small glimpse, for some, a hope of bridging the gap, as on August 31, 2018, the Archbishop of Moscow, on his own initiative, went to the headquarters of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In a same-day visit, Kirill was received in Istanbul with due cordiality, in Christ, of course.

The Patriarchate’s press release, as always in impeccable plain language, captured the mood of this important meeting as follows:

“His Holiness [sic: Bartholomew] welcomed with enthusiastic greetings the high visitor to the courts of the Mother Church, commemorating the memory of their predeceased Elders, the ever-dead Bishops Elder Meliton of Chalcedon and Nicodemus of Leningrad, as well as all those who have been involved in the bilateral relations between the two Churches and in the wider Orthodox relations, and stressing the importance of dialogue as a God-given means of overcoming the difficulties encountered. His Beatitude, in response, expressed his emotion and vivid memories of his visits to the Basilica of the Cities on various occasions and of his cooperation with H.H. Kirill, who, in his reply, expressed his enthusiasm and his vivid memories of his visits to the Basilica of the Cities and of his cooperation with H.H. Kirill. His Holiness.

There followed a long private discussion in the Patriarchal Office between the two Primates, etc.

But as it appeared afterwards, behind the protocols and the compliments on both sides, there was no point of convergence between Bartholomew and Cyril.

Of particular interest is the opinion of a prominent Russian theologian, Georges Florovsky, who concludes that “Russian thought does not suffer from Greek oppressive domination, but on the contrary, it suffers from its unwise and foolish interruption of the continuity of Byzantine and Greek traditions. This fact of departure from (Byzantine and Greek) succession brought about in the Russian soul a lasting and sterile fascination. Creation is impossible without living traditions. The denial of the Greek heritage can only amount today to ecclesiastical suicide.”