With the joint decision of the investigating magistrate and the prosecutor, the owner of the biscuit manufacturer “Violanta,” Konstantinos Tziortziotis, was ordered to be remanded in custody following his testimony.

According to information, he is expected to be transferred to Trikala Prison. Mr. Tziortziotis’s testimony regarding the explosion at the Trikala factory, which cost the lives of five female workers, lasted four hours and 45 minutes.

During the testimony, the investigating magistrate showed videos and photographs to the owner of Violanta, who stated that he was shocked by the explosion and claimed that he was unaware such a risk existed, adding—according to information—that his children used to play in that area.

According to the same sources, the owner pointed to individuals who signed documents, named associates who bore responsibility for many matters, and reportedly said that the issue of the odor reached his ears very late.

Testimonies of Violanta employees

As protothema.gr has reported, the propane leak—the cause of the explosion—had been detected at Violanta months before the accident of January 26, 2026.

The management and ownership of the factory were aware, yet no one took the deadly threat seriously. Apparently, no one took seriously issues of safety, evacuation plans in the event of an emergency or danger, or the training and drills of employees in safety protocols.

The timeline of the foretold disaster is captured through excerpts from the signed statements given by employees to the competent authorities. What follows are indicative points from their testimonies.

Worker 1. Two months at VIOLANTA, 31 years old

“About five days after I started work, around December 8–10, 2025, there was a gradual odor which at times intensified and at other times subsided. I can’t describe what kind of smell it was or its origin. I can only compare it to the smell cars emit at gas stations when refueling with LPG. I reported it to X and he reported it to the bosses, without my knowing what was said afterward. I also discussed it with colleague Y, who had the same view and had also reported it to the bosses.”

QUESTION: In the two months you have been there, has any malfunction occurred in any machine?
ANSWER: Yes, within December 2025 there was once a malfunction in a power strip to which the heater was connected, but we managed to prevent it.

QUESTION: Had X told you what you should do if there was a problem with the oven?
ANSWER: He showed me some things, but he did not show me what to do if the oven caught fire.

QUESTION: Do you know whether there is a camera monitoring system at the company and who manages it?
ANSWER: Yes, there is a camera system, but I don’t know who manages it. There are cameras inside the premises, specifically outside the kneading room. That camera covered the entire production area and also recorded the area where the explosion occurred.

QUESTION: Were there evacuation plans for such cases and had you received any kind of training?
ANSWER: There were plans, but no one ever showed them to me. During the time I was there, we did not carry out any kind of training.

QUESTION: When the incident you mentioned earlier took place, was there any kind of audible warning?
ANSWER: Before the explosion I didn’t hear anything. After the explosion I heard a small audible alarm.

Worker 2, 28 years at “Violanta”

“Nothing had ever changed; the same situation remained until the end. That is, where I had been working for 28 years, where my daughter was also working—who lost her life. Regarding the odor, I informed production manager Ω1 as well as the other production manager, Ω2, who assured us they would inform the plumber who would come to fix it. The plumber came, but he too assured us that there was no odor. In addition to the LPG odor on the production line, the electrical cables on the floor had caused electric shocks to employees, and I myself had been shocked, though my hand only went numb.

When inspections by EFET took place, we were informed they had come to the facilities, but EFET never came to Wing B. They simply told us EFET had left. In the 28 years I worked at the company, we had two small fire incidents in Wing B, specifically in the ovens, but each time they were dealt with by employees—although the Trikala Fire Service also came. The ovens operate on LPG; at the rear of Wing B’s facilities there were two large outdoor tanks. The odor was mainly noticeable in the dishwashing area and the bathrooms.

“I would add that in Wing B no maintenance was ever carried out. I have in my possession, on my mobile phone, photographic material dated 6/11/2024 showing the defects I mentioned above.”

Worker 3, 14 months at VIOLANTA, 27 years old

“I have been working at this factory for about the last 14 months. On the specific date, January 25, 2026, I went to work at 22:30 to take over my shift until the time the explosion was heard. I deliberately did not take a break so as to prepare for the morning shift. While I was in the kneading room and had stepped out of its entrance, I had a brief exchange with a colleague about the doughs. Note that the distance between us was about 10 meters, with no physical obstruction. After our conversation ended, at that moment the lights went out simultaneously and a loud noise was heard, which I would liken to a grenade blast, and out of the corner of my eye I saw various objects being hurled (panels, sheet metal, parts of ovens, etc.).

“From where I was standing, I saw in front of me a door that was open. I immediately went out the back side where the propane tanks are. I called the Hellenic Police at around 04:01. At the same time, I heard shouts from inside the facility calling for help, and I also heard the production supervisor on the night shift calling everyone to get out. I then went back inside from the same point I had exited with the colleague I had been speaking to earlier, but we were unable to do anything as sheets and the roof were collapsing and the fire had spread throughout the building, so we went back outside. I then moved along the back side toward the area where the physical recovery and rehabilitation center is located, and I remember stepping over debris caused by the explosion.

“I went to the front area where the parking lot is and found the rest of the employees there. I entered the area where the raw materials receiving warehouse was in the adjacent building so that I could go back to the building where the fire had broken out to help the women on my shift, who are also my friends, because up to that point I had not seen them. After entering the warehouse, I encountered H. (I don’t recall her surname), L.M., and G.S., who were hugging each other and covered in blood. We then went to a door that leads to a staircase from the raw materials warehouse; the door opened, but there was a lot of debris on the stairs, so we moved toward the truck loading bays. The first bay did not open. The second one did, and through it we all ended up in the parking lot. After that, we waited for the authorities to arrive on site. The building was by then almost completely engulfed in flames.”

The amateur plumber

Worker X.P. performed the duties of a plumber at Violanta, even though he did not possess any certification or technical school diploma as a specialized technician. He testified that he had detected the odor described by all the witnesses at least since November 2025. As he characteristically said, it smelled “like LPG.” It was stronger in the toilets and the dishwashing area, in Building 2.

“The employees had noticed it as well, some of whom pointed it out to me. I reported it verbally to the owner of Violanta, Konstantinos Tziortziotis, and together with the production manager we went to the toilets to find what it was that smelled like gas, but we couldn’t identify anything. Subsequently, a person who deals with gas installations was informed. Around mid-December he visited the factory and took measurements. On that particular day, he did not detect anything in the toilets.

“In the production areas we also checked together, he did not detect LPG.”

Asked by the investigating authorities what he told staff about the odor that continued to persist, the “plumber” said: “The production manager had told me to say that ‘the odor comes from the cesspits until we see what’s going on.’ Additionally, there was a loss of gas pressure in the ovens, which was pronounced over the last month and a half. However, it was not part of my duties to check and fix that.

“Eight years ago, Konstantinos Tziortziotis assigned me to install a new propane gas line to support the cereals production line. Tziortziotis gave me the plan so that I could carry out the installation, which I did, while he knew that I did not have a propane gas installer’s license.”

The alleged… cesspits

Worker 4, 24 years at VIOLANTA

“The smell was so strong that whatever was causing it—probably some gas—made my eyes sting. I have been working at the factory since 2002, in the building where the fire occurred. On the date of the explosion I was not working. In the last 15 days before the fire, I noticed a strange odor in the toilets of Building 2. Along with the odor, my eyes stung. It didn’t resemble a cesspit smell, nor a clear LPG smell. I did not smell this odor elsewhere in Building 2.

“I informed my shift supervisor about the smell. She had noticed it as well. In response, she told me she had informed those responsible. The rest of the staff on my shift had also smelled it. I heard that nine of my other colleagues had smelled it, and some others I don’t remember. They had informed the shift supervisor. I was concerned that the smell might be LPG. I conveyed this concern to the shift supervisor, and she told me she had informed those responsible, who said it was something in the cesspits and that they would pour something into the cesspits.”

Worker 5

“I was working in Wing B where the incident occurred, on the biscuit production line. I had detected an odor about four months earlier and I locate it in the toilet area. I identify this smell as LPG and not as a sewage smell. From what my colleagues told me, they had informed Ms. N. (I don’t remember her surname), and I had relied on that, but no work was done after this notification, because it kept smelling; the odor persisted. There were technicians who knew about the problem and did not do their job properly, resulting in the problem escalating and the explosion occurring.”

The expert and the foretold explosion

The mechanical engineer who was called by Violanta’s plumber to carry out a tightness test of the underground steel propane network, using the appropriate equipment and instruments, found a large gas leak in the above-ground network.

“Regarding the fire, today the plumber/technician called me to perform a tightness test of the underground steel propane network. I went to the site and installed the appropriate instruments and pressurized the network with nitrogen gas at five (5) bar, where a strong gas leak (nitrogen) was detected, which means there was a pre-existing leak in the underground network through which propane (fuel) was transported from the tanks to the burners of the ovens in the production area. Present at the site at that moment were a Fire Service unit, specifically a D.A.E.E. unit of the Hellenic Police, and on the company’s side the owner, Mr. Konstantinos Tziortziotis, and the plumbing technician.

“Subsequently, the head of the Fire Service ordered that the underground steel pipeline be uncovered using appropriate machinery (a small excavator). After uncovering a large section of the pipeline, and during the first test at a depth of 60 cm—without uncovering the pipeline—the detector showed a high concentration of propane at the 60 cm point, confirming prolonged propane leakage into the ground. Specifically, it showed 2,500 ppm, whereas the reading should have been zero if there were no leak. We then, under police instruction, went to the basement area, and at the corner upon entering to the left, I again placed the device into a hole in the concrete from construction formwork tie holes and took a measurement. The device showed 6,000 ppm at that point.

“I believe that long-term leakage from the underground steel pipe, finding loose soil, vented into the basement area and, being heavier than air, remained at the lower part of the basement, with the result that when it reached the point of explosiveness—and likely with the contribution of a spark from an electric motor—the explosion was triggered with a very strong blast wave.”